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The Time Has Come for a 
Restatement of Child Sex Abuse 
Marci A. Hamilton† 
INTRODUCTION 
Child sex abuse is a widespread, persistent, and prevalent 
evil that is finally getting the attention it needs in the media and 
the courts. For centuries, children’s suffering on this account was 
accepted, taboo, or willfully ignored. That has changed as we have 
entered an era that portends a civil rights movement for children 
and dramatic increases in our knowledge about the realities of 
child sex abuse. The law, as usual, has been slow to catch up to 
the social science and policy needs, but the time is now to bring 
together the fast-advancing field of law that is assisting these 
victims and improving the odds of preventing abuse and bringing 
those who are responsible for it to justice. 
Restatements are not only statements of black letter 
law, but also “re-statements” in the sense that the Reporters 
have latitude to point the way on legal developments in the 
field. The time is ripe to restate the law of child sex abuse. Not 
only has the law been rapidly developing over the last 20 years, 
but there is now a well-developed science of child sex abuse that 
informs the law and which is quite helpful for lawmakers setting 
public policy and judges interpreting the law. Thus, for lawyers, 
judges, policymakers, and scholars, the time has come to survey 
and document the many interrelated issues on which there is 
growing or even near-complete agreement and to chart the way 
for the future. It is also worthwhile to highlight where courts 
are struggling to find clear standards and whether legislatures 
need to clarify their standards or consider new approaches. 
Importantly, social science is developing at an even faster 
rate than both federal and state law, with the law often laboring 
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to catch up to the hundreds of studies on the causes and effects 
of child sex abuse, the difficulties victims face in coming forward, 
the ways in which institutions perpetuate abuse, and the effects 
of child pornography. The critical facts that have emerged from 
the social science research include: (1) 20-25% of children are 
sexually abused;1 (2) only 10% report the crime to the 
authorities;2 (3) most victims (roughly 75%) are abused by people 
they know well, either family members or someone outside the 
family the child knows and trusts;3 (4) “Stranger Danger” cases 
are relatively rare, although they get the most publicity when 
they involve abduction and/or death;4 and (5) the vast majority of 
victims need decades to come forward, and many never do.5 The 
crime is accompanied by confusion, shame, embarrassment, fear, 
and guilt, which often lead to lifelong effects including Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder, drug addiction, alcoholism, sex 
addiction and disorders, difficulties with personal relationships, a 
failure to fulfill one’s potential at school or on the job, and a 
disproportionate number of suicides.6 These facts are critically 
important for crafting the most appropriate statutes of limitations, 
mandatory reporting statutes, liability for perpetrators and 
institution-based abuse, protections for children abused within the 
home, and rules of evidence in child sexual abuse. 
This paper will summarize some of the relevant topics 
that a Restatement on Child Sex Abuse Law should address. 
This summary is by no means intended to cover all of the 
issues that are relevant (after all, what are committees and 
Reporters for?), but rather to begin to sketch out for the ALI, 
lawyers, judges, and scholars some aspects of this critically 
 
 1 See Prevalence of Individual Adverse Childhood Experiences, CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ace/prevalence.htm (last updated 
Jan. 18, 2013); see also Shanta R. Dube et al., Long-Term Consequences of Childhood Sexual 
Abuse by Gender of Victim, 28 AM. J. PREV. MED. 430, 433 (2005), available at 
http://www.jimhopper.com/pdfs/Dube_(2005)_Childhood_sexual_abuse_
by_gender_of_victim.pdf. 
 2 Statistics-Child Sexual Abuse, PARENTS FOR MEGAN’S LAW & CRIME VICTIMS 
CENTER, http://www.parentsformeganslaw.org/public/statistics_childSexualAbuse.html (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2013). 
 3 See Statistics Surrounding Child Sexual Abuse, DARKNESS TO LIGHT, 
http://oldsite.d2l.org/KnowAbout/statistics_2.asp (last visited July 2, 2012). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See e.g., R.L. v. Voytac, 971 A.2d 1074, 1084 (N.J. 2009) (quoting Jones v. 
Jones, 576 A.2d 316, 321 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (noting that “long after the 
cycle of abuse itself has been broken, the victim will repress and deny, even to himself 
or herself, what has happened”); see also Statistics-Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 2. 
 6 See Guy R. Holmes, Liz Offen, & Glenn Waller, See No Evil, Hear No Evil, 
Speak No Evil: Why Do Relatively Few Male Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse Receive 
Help for Abuse-Related Issues in Adulthood?, 17 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 69, 72-73 (1997). 
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important area of the law which would benefit from a 
Restatement. 
I. STATUTES OF LIMITATION FOR CHILD SEX ABUSE 
A. Introductory Material 
A statute of limitations (SOL) is the maximum amount 
of time one has to file charges or bring a civil lawsuit following 
an injury or other ground for a lawsuit. It is quite literally the 
threshold for victims’ access to justice. Statutes of limitation 
vary from state to state and from claim to claim. For example, 
a limitation for a lawsuit over a contract may be different from a 
lawsuit about a personal injury and both may be of varying 
durations across different states. The SOL may also be set to 
begin running (“accrue”) at different times. Under some statutes 
accrual begins at the time of the injury while others accrue only 
when a victim “discovers” any injuries,7 or the causal connection 
of injuries to abuse, or when the victim becomes aware of 
information third parties had about the perpetrator. In many 
states, conditions may cause a statute of limitations to be 
“tolled,” or legally suspended such that it does not begin to run 
until a proscribed time. 
Child sex abuse SOLs are set by each state. For federal 
offenses, SOLs are set by the federal government. An adult SOL 
for child sex abuse is typically distinct from other child abuse or 
rape statutes of limitation. At one time, in most states, child sex 
abuse SOLs were triggered by the act of abuse itself, with the 
victim accorded a set number of years from the date of the abuse 
to bring the claim. For example, if a seven-year-old was raped by 
her father, in one state she would have two years, until age nine, 
to file charges or sue on civil claims. In another she might have 
until age 19, a year past reaching majority. The idea historically 
was that children “knew” they were being harmed during the 
act. In that era, there were few studies about the dynamic of 
abuse or its effects on the victims. Nor was there an adequate 
appreciation of the special dangers inherent in situations where 
one person has significantly more power over another. The vast 
majority of states have now rejected these approaches. 
Social science studies have shown that children in fact do 
not fully understand (if they understand it at all) what sex is, 
 
 7 Marci A. Hamilton, What is a Statute of Limitations, SOL REFORM, 
http://sol-reform.com/Pages/WhatIsSOL.php (last visited July 7, 2013). 
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and certainly have no idea of the lifelong consequences of being 
sexually assaulted. The aggressor always has power over them, 
and, in the case of parents or guardians, it is a particularly 
egregious power differential as the child is dependent on them 
for providing life’s basic needs including shelter, food, and 
clothing. Abusers commonly threaten the child to maintain the 
silence. Where the abuser is a family member, the child is often 
charged, consciously or subconsciously, with keeping the secret 
to hold the family together. In the institutional setting, the adult 
exercises power through the structure of the organization. Thus, 
at Penn State, Coach Jerry Sandusky held power over the boys he 
abused because he had the capacity to “make” their football 
careers by getting them into Penn State; in religious institutions, 
the priest or rabbi holds spiritual power that can be every bit as 
compelling as the power of the parent; and in schools, teachers 
have power over grades and advancement. The predators’ 
capacity to control the child is compounded by the fact that many 
predators choose children who are in need and offer gifts, money, 
and loving attention the child can get nowhere else. 
All of these factors—failure to understand, powerlessness, 
and a sadly contorted sense of obligation or responsibility—
contribute to victims’ incapacity to come forward. Hundreds of 
studies have documented the psychological barriers to revealing 
the abuse and have shown that, typically, a survivor needs 
decades to process and understand the abuse. As a result, many 
do not tell others about the abuse until their forties, fifties, or 
even later. This dynamic has mobilized the movement to extend 
and eliminate SOLs, and to revive them for survivors for whom 
the SOL has expired.8 
With 51 relevant jurisdictions in the United States, it can 
be difficult to stay abreast of current developments, which is 
why I created the website www.sol-reform.com. At this point, the 
50 states and the District of Columbia are a patchwork of SOLs, 
which can change as often as every year.9 A decided trend has 
emerged from this proliferation of amendments to SOL 
legislation in recent years, with all but one state liberalizing or 
eliminating the SOLs.10 Delaware completely eliminated the 
 
 8 Marci A. Hamilton, The Year in Review: 2012 Marks the Highest 
Watermark Yet for Victims of Child Sex Abuse, JUSTIA (Dec. 13, 2012), 
http://verdict.justia.com/2012/12/13/the-year-in-review. 
 9 My website, www.sol-reform.com, tracks the limits in each state and the 
federal government. 
 10 Only South Dakota has shortened child sex abuse SOLs, when it retracted 
the SOL in the face of lawsuits filed by Native American victims against Roman 
Catholic priests. Marci A. Hamilton, A Tale of Two States and Three Survivors: The Legal 
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civil and criminal SOLs on claims of child sex abuse prospectively, 
and has enacted two windows for purposes of permitting victims 
to sue for damages even though their SOL already expired.11 
Other states, including Florida, have also eliminated some SOLs 
prospectively,12 but have not taken action to create opportunities 
for survivors whose SOLs have expired. 
At another end of the spectrum is New York, for example, 
which forecloses most criminal charges unless victims press 
charges by the age of 23; and forecloses civil claims after the 
victims reaches age 28. However, even New York has eliminated 
an SOL for felonious acts of child sex abuse.13 In general, many 
states have successfully relaxed their child sex abuse SOLs over 
the last two decades and many place the issue on their legislative 
agendas on a regular basis.14 
B. Criminal v. Civil Statutes of Limitation 
1. Generally 
There is a critical difference between criminal and civil 
statutes of limitation. While criminal SOLs cannot be applied 
retroactively,15 the Supreme Court has ruled that civil SOLs are 
merely a legislative convenience, enacted by the grace of the 
various legislatures, which may be changed should the legislature 
see fit.16 Thus, a civil SOL may be extended retroactively for 
victims whose SOLs have already expired. Some states have 
enacted “windows,” which make it possible for survivors to file 
civil claims even if their SOL has expired, within a given period of 
time. For example, Delaware enacted a two-year window. In 
                                                                                                             
Obstacles Relating to Syracuse University’s Sex Abuse Scandal, JUSTIA (Dec. 1, 2011), 
http://verdict.justia.com/2011/12/01/a-tale-of-two-states-and-three-survivors; Stephanie 
Woodard, South Dakota Quashes New Childhood Sexual Abuse Bill, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 9, 2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/article/
south-dakota-legislature-quashes-new-childhood-sexual-abuse-bill-96429. 
 11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8145(a)–(b) (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 205(e) (2013); H.R. 326, 145th Gen. Assemb., (Del. 2010). 
 12 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 95.11(9), 775.15(1) & (14) (West 2013). 
 13 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(3)(f) & (2)(a) (McKinney 2013). 
 14 See Marci A. Hamilton, Summary of Statutes of Limitations Reform Across 
the United States, SOL REFORM (June 28, 2013), http://sol-reform.com/SNAPSHOT_
OF_SOL_STATUTES_AND_2013_PENDING_BILLS_ACROSS_THE_US.pdf. It is my 
view that eventually the SOLs for child sex abuse will be eliminated in every state. The 
primary barrier is political, as opposed to principle; see also http://sol-reform.com/News/
january-9-2014-marci-a-hamilton-2013-the-year-in-review-for-child-sex-abuse-victims-
access-to-justice/. 
 15 See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003). 
 16 Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). 
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Sheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis De Sales,17 the Supreme Court 
of Delaware upheld Delaware’s civil window legislation. The 
Court held that application of a law that repeals the SOL on 
child sex-related abuse and permits a two-year window for 
victims to file civil suits on previously barred actions and 
revive gross negligence claims against institutional defendants 
that employed or controlled an alleged abuser did not violate 
federal or state due process.18 
Because civil SOLs may be changed at the will of the 
legislature, it is constitutional for a legislature to allow victims who 
have run out of time under an SOL to later bring a suit. Some 
states have even passed “Window Legislation,” which “essentially 
opens a specified duration [of time] in which civil claims that would 
have been barred [by the SOL] can be brought.”19 Windows were 
not invented for child sex abuse cases. The idea was initially tested 
to address mass torts for, for example, chemical or asbestos 
exposure, in Delaware, New York, Minnesota, and California.20 
However, California,21 Delaware,22 Hawaii,23 Minnesota,24 and 
Guam25 have now all enacted window legislation, and similar 
legislation is pending in Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
and Pennsylvania. Delaware, in response to a realization that, due 
to a technicality, its first window did not cover healthcare workers, 
enacted an additional window to provide access to justice for 
children abused in a healthcare setting.26 
 
 17 15 A.3d 1247, 1248 (Del. 2011). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Marci A. Hamilton, What is a SOL? SOL REFORM, http://sol-reform.com/
Pages/WhatIsSOL.php#window (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). 
 20 Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co., 752 F. Supp. 286 (D. Minn. 
1990); 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611, 633 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 811-12 (E.D.N.Y. 
1984); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of America, Inc., 534 A.2d 272, 276-77 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1987); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1079-80 (N.Y. 1989). 
 21 Melanie H. v. Defendant Doe, No. 04-CV-1596-WQH-(WMC), at 25 (S.D. 
Cal. Dec. 21, 2005); Deutsch v. Masonic Homes of California, Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 368, 
378-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Here is What is Happening in 
California, SOL REFORM, http://sol-reform.com/California/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). 
 22 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8145(a)–(b) (2013); see also Marci A. Hamilton, 
Here is What is Happening in Delaware, SOL REFORM, http://sol-reform.com/Delaware/. 
 23 S.B. 2588, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2012); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Here 
is What is Happening in Hawaii, SOL REFORM, http://sol-reform.com/Hawaii/ (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2013). 
 24 2011 Minn. Laws. ch. 190 § 541.073(2); Gomon v. Northland Family 
Physicians, Ltd., 645 N.W.2d 413, 414, 418-20 (Minn. 2002); K.E. v. Hoffman, 452 
N.W.2d 509, 512-14 (Minn. App. 1990). 
 25 B. No. 34, 31st Leg. (Guam 2011); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Here is What is 
Happening in Guam, SOL REFORM, http://sol-reform.com/Guam/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). 
 26 18 DEL. CODE tit. 18, § 6856(3)(b) (2010). 
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Windows are only constitutional on the civil side of the 
law. On the other hand, once a criminal SOL runs out, a guilty 
perpetrator or institution cannot be criminally charged. The 
United States Supreme Court, in Stogner v. California,27 held the 
California window on the criminal side unconstitutional as it 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.28 Thus, when a criminal SOL 
expires, there is no possibility of reviving it. The only means of 
revival is through civil lawsuits for damages. 
2. Criminal Statutes of Limitation 
A criminal SOL is the maximum amount of time during 
which a prosecutor may bring charges after the time of injury 
occurs.29 The criminal SOL, like the civil SOL, may be set to begin 
running at different times. There is a growing trend among states 
to increase or eliminate the SOL for crimes related to child sexual 
assault.30 In the past year, Arkansas31 and Illinois32 eliminated 
their criminal SOLs. Some states do not require an SOL for first-
degree child sex abuse offenses but do impose a limitation period on 
felony and misdemeanor sex crimes against minors.33 
In cases with minors, in all but one state, the statutes of 
limitations are tolled until the age of majority, which is typically 
18.34 This means that the SOL does not begin to run until a 
proscribed time that is most often when the victim turns 18 and is 
no longer considered a minor. Thus, a tolled criminal SOL might 
be eight years after the moment a victim turns 18-years-old.35 
 
 27 539 U.S. 607, 609 (2003). 
 28 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl.1. 
 29 Jenna Miller, Note, The Constitutionality of and Need for Retroactive Civil 
Legislation Relating to Child Sexual Abuse, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 599, 600 (2011). 
 30 Id. at 625. 
 31 S.B. 92, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 89th Gen. Assem. (Ark. 2013) (enacted) (eliminating 
limitation of time for bringing a criminal action with respect to child sex abuse). 
 32 H.B. 1063, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013) (passed but pending 
governor’s signature). 
 33 For example, New York has no limitations period for first-degree criminal 
offenses. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(2)(a) (McKinney 2013). However, there is a 
five-year limitations period for all other felony sex offenses, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
§ 30.10(2)(b) (McKinney 2013), and a two-year limitations period for misdemeanor sex 
offenses. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(2)(c) (McKinney 2013). 
 34 See generally SOL REFORM, www.sol-reform.com. 
 35 In California, under current law, the SOL is tolled 8 years, until the victim 
reaches 26, or for 3 years after the date “the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should 
have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority 
was caused by the sexual abuse.” (with certificate of merit only). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 340.1(a)–(h) (West 2013). 
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However, when a legislative body decides to increase or 
remove an SOL, it cannot apply the changes retroactively.36 Thus 
any new criminal statutes of limitation laws are applied only to 
incidents after the date the law is effective. Once a statute of 
limitations runs out, even a guilty perpetrator cannot be 
criminally charged. 
3. Civil Statutes of Limitation 
A civil SOL does not begin to run until a claim “accrues,” 
and accrual varies from state to state and depending upon the 
type of harm.37 In the context of child sexual abuse, in those states 
which follow the discovery rule, accrual does not occur until a 
victim “discovers” any injuries,38 or the causal connection to those 
injuries. It is widely accepted that the victims of child sexual 
assault do not discover the extent of their injuries until much 
later in life, after the actual abuse.39 In some states, there is a 
special rule for cases of repressed memory.40 
Legislation that eliminates the civil SOL or includes a 
discovery rule is supported by various studies on the long-term 
effects of child molestation and the likely delay in disclosure. 
Researchers in various studies have found—specifically in men 
who were sexually abused as children—that long-term 
adaptation will often include sexual problems, dysfunctions or 
compulsions, confusion and struggles over gender and sexual 
identity, homophobia and confusion about sexual orientation, 
problems with intimacy, shame, guilt and self-blame, low self-
esteem, negative self–images, increased anger, and conflicts with 
authority figures.41 There is also an increased rate of substance 
abuse, a tendency to deny and delegitimize the traumatic 
experience, symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and 
increased probability of fear and depression for all victims.42 
Often, it is not until years after the sexual abuse that victims 
 
 36 See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) (holding that the retroactive 
application of the California law violated ex post facto law). 
 37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 (1979). 
 38 Marci A. Hamilton, What is a Statute of Limitations?, SOL REFORM, 
http://sol-reform.com/Pages/WhatIsSOL.php (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). 
 39 Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983). 
 40 See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5107(e)(6)(D) (West 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 11, § 205(e) (2013). 
 41 Major Findings, Adverse Childhood Experiences Study, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/ace/findings.htm. 
 42 Id. 
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experience these negative outcomes.43 As clinician Mic Hunter has 
observed: “Some of the effects of sexual abuse do not become 
apparent until the victim is an adult and a major life event, 
such as marriage or birth of a child, takes place. Therefore, a 
child who seemed unharmed by childhood abuse can develop 
crippling symptoms years later . . . .”44 
The lawsuits filed under window legislation have led to the 
public identification of previously unknown child predators, which 
reduces the odds that children will be abused in the future.45 For 
example, the 2003 window in California led to the public 
identification of over 300 previously unidentified perpetrators.46 
Delaware’s window has led to the public identification of dozens of 
previously hidden perpetrators. Hawaii’s currently open window 
has identified Jay Ram, who allegedly used the foster care system 
to obtain boys, adopt them, and sexually abuse them while 
neglecting their needs,47 while Minnesota’s open window has 
triggered a waterfall of disclosures that never would have 
happened without the window.48 
In civil suits, window legislation affording retroactive 
application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, even if the 
court applies the criminal code active during the alleged assault, 
and not the code in existence at the time of trial.49 While some 
courts differ on this issue, the majority of states do not find 
retroactive civil SOLs unconstitutional.50 
 
 43 What are the Effects of Child Sexual Abuse?, Understanding Child Sexual 
Abuse: Education, Prevention, and Recovery, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, 
http://www.apa.org/pubs/info/brochures/sex-abuse.aspx?item=4 (last visited Sept. 25, 
2013); see also R.L. v. Voytac, 971 A.2d 1074, 1084 (N.J. 2009) (quoting Jones v. Jones, 
576 A.2d 316, 321 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)) (“[L]ong after the cycle of abuse 
itself has been broken, the victim will repress and deny, even to himself or herself, 
what has happened.”). 
 44 MIC HUNTER, ABUSED BOYS: THE NEGLECTED VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 
59 (1990) (explaining that at the time the child is sexually abused he or she is often too 
young to appreciate the harmful nature of the acts). 
 45 Jeffrey Pruzan, Note, Abuse, Mediation and the Catholic Church: How 
Enforcing and Improving Existing Statutes Will Help Victims Recover, 13 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 593, 605 (2012). 
 46 Marci A. Hamilton, The Maturing of a Movement: Statute of Limitations 
Reform for Sex Abuse Victims, FINDLAW (June 11, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
hamilton/20090611.html. 
 47  Former Big Island Farmer Accused of Abusing Child, HAW. NEWS NOW 
(Mar. 4, 2013, 4:11 PM). http://sol-reform.com/Hawaii/Hawaii-window-creates-justice-
for-survivor-of-abuse-by-adoptive-father.pdf. 
 48 Marci A. Hamilton, News: Post MN Window SOL REFORM, http://sol-
reform.com/News/topics/mn-post-window/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). 
 49 Sheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247, 1258 (Del. 2011). 
 50 Compare Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska v. Does, 141 P.3d 719, 725 (Alaska 
2006), Riggs Nat’l Bank v. Dist. of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229 (D.C. 1990), and Neiman v. 
Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 613 N.W.2d 160, 161 (Wis. 2000) (holding that retroactive 
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4. Trends in Statutes of Limitation Reform 
The pace of SOL reform has increased markedly over 
the last several years. In 2013 alone, SOL reform was enacted 
in Arkansas, where the state eliminated the criminal SOL;51 
Illinois, where the civil and criminal SOLs were eliminated;52 
Vermont, where the SOL was increased for certain sex crimes 
against children;53 Nevada, where the criminal statute of 
limitations was extended;54 and Minnesota, where a window was 
enacted.55 Bills were introduced for at least the second time in 
Pennsylvania (window; civil and criminal elimination);56 New 
Jersey (window and extension of discovery rule);57 and 
                                                                                                             
application of statutes of limitation is unconstitutional), with San Carlos Apache Tribe 
v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 192-93 (Ariz. 1999), 
superseded by statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-505 (2010), Liebig v. Superior Court, 
257 Cal. Rptr. 574 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 1989), Mudd v. McColgan, 183 P.2d 10, 13 (Cal. 
1947), Rossi v. Osage Highland Dev., LLC, 219 P.3d 319, 322 (Colo. App. 2009) (citing 
In re Estate of Randall, 441 P.2d 153, 155 (Colo. 1968)), Shell Western E&P, Inc. v. 
Dolores County Bd. of Comm’rs, 948 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Colo. 1997) (en banc), Roberts v. 
Caton, 619 A.2d 844 (Conn. 1993), Whitwell v. Archmere Acad., Inc., C.A. No: 07C-08-
006 (RBY), 2008 Del. Super. LEXIS 141 at *3, 7-8 (Del. Super. Ct. April 16, 2008), 
Vaughn v. Vulcan Materials Co., 465 S.E.2d 661 (Ga. 1996), Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. 
Hyman, 975 P.2d 211 (Haw. 1999), Roe v. Doe, 581 P.2d 310, 314 (Haw. 1978), 
Henderson v. Smith, 915 P.2d 6, 10 (Idaho 1996), Hecla Mining Co. v. Idaho State Tax 
Comm’n, 697 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Idaho 1985), Metro Holding Co. v. Mitchell, 589 N.E.2d 
217, 219 (Ind. 1992), Ripley v. Tolbert, 921 P.2d 1210, 1224 (Kan. 1996), Shirley v. Reif, 
920 P.2d 405, 411-12 (Kan. 1996), Kienzler v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 686 
N.E.2d 447, 451 (Mass. 1997), Rookledge v. Garwood, 65 N.W.2d 785, 791 (Mich. 1954), 
Gomon v. Northland Family Physicians, Ltd., 645 N.W.2d 413, 419-20 (Minn. 2002), 
Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe, 864 P.2d 776, 778 (Mont. 1993), Panzino v. Cont’l Can Co., 364 A.2d 
1043, 1045-46 (N.J. 1976), Bunton v. Abernathy, 73 P.2d 810, 811-12 (N.M. 1937), 
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1079 (N.Y. 1989), In Interest of W.M.V., 268 
N.W.2d 781, 786 (N.D. 1978), Pratte v. Stewart, 929 N.E.2d 415, 422 (Ohio 2010), 
McFadden v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 112 P.3d 1191, 1195 (Or. 2005), McDonald v. Redevelopment 
Auth., 952 A.2d 713, 717-18 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008), Bible v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 696 
A.2d 1149, 1156 (Pa. 1997), Stratmeyer v. Stratmeyer, 567 N.W.2d 220, 224 (S.D. 1997), 
Ballard Square Condo. Owners Ass’n v. Dynasty Constr. Co., 146 P.3d 914, 923 (Wash. 
2006) (en banc) superseded by statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.303 (2013), as 
recognized in Chadwick Farms Owners Ass’n v. FHC, LLC, 207 P.3d 1251, 1260 (Wash. 
2009) (en banc), RM v. State Dep’t of Family Servs., Div. of Public Servs., 891 P.2d 791, 
792 (Wyo. 1995) (all holding that retroactive application of statutes of limitation is not 
unconstitutional), and Alsenz v. Twin Lakes Village, Inc., 843 P.2d 834, 837-38 (Nev. 1992) 
(open question). 
 51 S.B. 92, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 89th Gen. Assem. (Ark. 2013) (enacted). 
 52 H.B. 1063, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013); S.B. 1399, 98th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013). 
 53 S.B. 20, 2013, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2013) (enacted). 
 54 S.B. 103, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013). 
 55 H.B. 681, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2013) (enacted). 
 56 H.B. 237, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013); H.B. 238, 2013 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013). 
 57 S.B. 2281, 215th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2012). 
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Massachusetts (civil extension to age 55 with a window).58 They 
were also introduced in New York (window; civil and criminal 
elimination);59 Missouri (elimination of civil and criminal);60 
Oregon (elimination criminal for certain sex crimes against 
minors);61 Washington (extension of criminal to 30);62 and 
Wisconsin (elimination of civil with a window).63 The California 
legislature passed a second window to capture those survivors 
who did not file under the window that was in effect in 2003; it 
was vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown.64 
II. MANDATORY REPORTING AND REPORTERS 
A. Mandatory Reporters—Specified 
Mandatory reporting laws are essential in the pursuit of 
justice, as child sex abuse victims are often unable to report the 
abuse themselves. Every state has mandatory reporting laws 
that require specified individuals who suspect that a child has 
been or is being sexually abused to report the incident. Although 
mandatory reporting rules vary by state, 48 states currently have 
mandatory reporting laws that specify professionals who are 
subject to the legislation.65 Two states have general reporting 
mandates.66 Specified mandated reporters include teachers, 
nurses, physicians, other healthcare providers, social service 
employees, mental health professionals, law enforcement, and 
others in professional child care.67 Some states also include 
individuals who work in film or photography processing, drug 
abuse counselors, staff at camps and recreation centers, domestic 
 
 58 H.B. 1455, 188th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013); S.B. 633, 188th Gen. 
Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013). 
 59 Assemb. A01771, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013). 
 60 H.B. 247, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013). 
 61 H.B. 3284, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013). 
 62 S.B. 5100, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013). 
 63 S.B. 225, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2013). 
 64 S.B. 131, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). It was vetoed by Governor Jerry 
Brown. Letter from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor of California, to Members of the 
California State Senate (Oct. 12, 2013), available at http://sol-reform.com/News/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/SB_131_2013_Veto_Message.pdf; Marci A. Hamilton, Gov. 
Jerry Brown’s Recent Veto of Child Abuse Legislation and What It Tells Us About the 
Civil Rights Movement for Children, JUSTIA (Oct. 17, 2013), http://verdict.justia.com/
2013/10/17/gov-jerry-browns-recent-veto-child-abuse-legislation-tells-us-civil-rights-
movement-children. 
 65 Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect, CHILD WELFARE 
INFORMATION GATEWAY (Aug. 2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/
laws_policies/statutes/manda.pdf. 
 66 New Jersey and Wyoming. Id. at 2. 
 67 Id. 
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violence workers, court-appointed guardians, and members of the 
clergy.68 Upon suspecting, observing, or having reason to believe 
that a child is being sexually abused, mandated reporters are 
responsible for calling and reporting the abuse to a hotline.69 
If it is discovered that a mandated reporter knew or 
should have known of sexual abuse of a child and failed to report 
it, he or she is subject to prosecution by the state.70 The reporter 
who fails to fulfill his obligation can also be subjected to fines.71 
Generally there must be a concrete, reportable incident 
for the mandatory report to be triggered.72 Otherwise, the 
failure of the reporter to inform the state of the abuse will not 
result in criminal or civil liability.73 Reporters are usually kept 
anonymous, but this protection may be waived if it is 
determined that the caller knowingly and intentionally made a 
fraudulent report.74 The reporter may also voluntarily waive 
the protection and have his or her identity disclosed.75 
After a number of child sex abuse scandals were 
uncovered and publicized, there was an increase in new 
legislation aimed at expanding the scope of mandatory reporting 
laws. Arkansas, Washington D.C., Florida, Illinois, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Oregon, South Dakota, West Virginia, Virginia, and 
Washington all passed new laws that expand the list of 
mandatory reporters to include individuals who work in 
institutions of secondary and higher education.76 Some of these 
laws also specifically include athletic personnel, who are generally 
considered outside the scope of educational professionals such as 
 
 68 Id. at 2-3. 
 69 Id. at 3. 
 70 See Penalties for Failure to Report and False Reporting of Child Abuse and 
Neglect, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY (Aug. 2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/
systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/report.pdf. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Summary Guide for Mandated Reporters in New York State, NEW YORK 
STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES (Sept. 2012), http://ocfs.ny.gov/main/
publications/Pub1159.pdf. 
 74 Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 65, at 5. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Ana M. Valdes, Sex Abuse Reporting Requirements Taking Effect 
Nationwide, in Wake of Sandusky Case, WPTV (June 30, 2012), http://www.wptv.com/dpp/
news/sex-abuse-reporting-requirements-taking-effect-nationwide-in-wake-of-sandusky-
case; Mandatory Reporting of Child Abuse and Neglect: 2013 Introduced Legislation, 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 5, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/human-services/mandatory-rprtg-of-child-abuse-and-neglect-2013.aspx.; see also 
Illinois Aims to Head Off Sex Abuse Scandals Like at Penn State, REUTERS (June 27, 
2012, 11:57 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/27/us-usa-illinois-law-abuse-
idUSBRE85Q14S20120627. 
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teachers.77 Many additional states also attempted to pass wider-
reaching mandatory reporting laws, which were stalled in their 
state legislatures.78 
B. Mandatory Reporting—General/Unspecified 
New Jersey and Wyoming are the only two states in the 
U.S. that have general mandatory reporting laws as opposed to 
specified professionals who are subject to the requirements.79 
General mandatory reporting laws require anyone who suspects 
or has reason to believe that the sexual abuse of a child is 
occurring to report the incident to a state agency. Mandatory 
reporting can also be based on actual knowledge or observation of 
abuse.80 Like specified mandatory reporting, general mandatory 
reporter laws implement fines and criminal punishments for 
failure to report when it is uncovered that someone had reasonable 
cause to believe that abuse was occurring and did not report it. 
Aside from New Jersey and Wyoming, a number of other 
states have additional provisions beyond the specified mandatory 
reporters that require any person who knows, suspects, or has 
reason to believe that child sexual abuse is occurring to report 
that abuse to a hotline.81 Furthermore, while the focus of this 
section is mandatory reporters, all states allow anyone who 
knows, suspects, or has reason to believe that there is child sexual 
abuse occurring to report the incident. This is known as 
permissive reporting.82 
C. Confessional Exemption 
Most states allow for exceptions to reporting 
requirements for members of the clergy if the suspicion of 
abuse is based on a statement made in confession. Currently, 
only Connecticut, Mississippi, and New Jersey do not address the 
confessional exemption in their mandatory reporting laws.83 New 
Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, 
West Virginia, and Guam explicitly reject the confessional 
exemption from mandatory reporting laws; clergy members may 
 
 77 Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 65, at 3. 
 78 Mandatory Reporting of Child Abuse and Neglect: 2013 Introduced 
Legislation, supra note 76. 
 79 Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 65, at 2 n.1. 
 80 Id. at 3. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 4 n.9. 
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not claim that a statement related to child sex abuse was 
privileged as an excuse for failing to fulfill their obligations 
under mandatory reporting laws.84 
Confessional exemptions cover all religions in the sense 
that if a believer converses with a religious leader and 
confesses to child sex abuse, that exchange might be privileged 
and the religious leader not subject to the mandatory reporting 
laws. Many religious institutions invoke these exemptions to 
justify the failure to report suspected child sex abuse occurring 
within their congregations. The breadth of the exemption varies 
from state to state. In some jurisdictions, the confessional 
exemption has been limited to statements made in seeking 
spiritual advice.85 It is not enough that the statement was made 
to a religious leader; the statement must be made in confidence 
while seeking spiritual advice. In other jurisdictions, the 
exemption is interpreted more broadly. 
Once a believer has waived the privilege, such as 
through voluntary admission to a non-clergy member or in a 
deposition or other pre-trial discovery, the exemption no longer 
applies.86 So long as the believer knew when he voluntarily 
 
 84 Id. at 4 n.10. 
 85 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505(b) (West 2013). (“A communication between a 
member of the clergy and a person is ‘confidential’ if made privately for the purpose of 
seeking spiritual counsel and advice from the member of the clergy in the usual course 
of his or her practice or discipline and not intended for further disclosure except to 
other persons present in furtherance of the communication.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-
5(g) (West 2013). (“[C]lergy shall not be required to report child abuse reported solely 
within the context of confession or other similar communication required to be kept 
confidential under church doctrine or practice.”). 
 86 Monroe v. State, 14 So. 3d 1205, 1207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (finding 
testimony by minister as to confession defendant-confessor made to minister was 
admissible because defendant knew when defendant voluntarily made disclosure that 
it would not be held confidential by minister and would be subject to disclosure to 
police under Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 90.505(1)(b) and 90.507); Lifemark Hosp. of Fla., Inc. v. 
Hernandez, 748 So. 2d 378, 379-80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (finding waiver of privilege 
where plaintiff previously provided psychologist’s records to plaintiff ’ s expert); Herron v. E. 
Indus., No. 5:07cv35/RH/EMT, 74 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 824, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 69339, *17 n.2 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2007) (noting that privilege may be waived via 
disclosures made in court documents under § 90.507, Fla. Stat. which provides that a 
“person who has a privilege against the disclosure of a confidential matter or communication 
waives the privilege if the person . . . voluntarily discloses or makes the communication 
when . . . she does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy”); Doe v. Mann, No. 6:05-cv-
259-Orl-31DAB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65769, *3 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2006) (“Under 
Florida law . . . privilege can be waived [if] the holder of the privilege . . . ‘voluntarily 
discloses or makes the communication when he does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication.’”); 
State v. Gray, 2004-1197 (La. , Jan. 19, 2005), 891 So. 2d 1260, 1265 (Clergymen privilege 
waived if information disclosed to third parties); Perry v. State, 280 Ark. 36, 37 (1983) (“We 
agree with the trial court that Perry told about everyone he could about killing his wife and, 
therefore, waived any privilege he might claim.”); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Super. Ct. In & For Maricopa Cnty., 764 P.2d 759, 764 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) 
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disclosed the previously privileged statement that it was no 
longer confidential, it is unprotected in all future litigation. If 
the believer no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the communication, the privilege has ceased.87 Once the 
privilege is lost, typically a clergy member cannot claim 
confessional exemption under the mandatory reporter laws.88 
The clergy member cannot claim that he has a right to keep the 
information confidential because the privileged nature of the 
statement really belongs to the believer and not the clergy 
member or his institution.89 Further, once the privilege has 
been waived it cannot be reinstated.90 
Every state has made strides in increasing the protection 
to children through mandatory reporting laws, whether it be 
through specified or general reporting obligations, and through 
the permissive legislation.91 While some states have also provided 
for a confessional exemption, the breadth and scope of that 
exemption varies. Courts should remain cognizant that once a 
believer waives the confidential nature of the confession, the 
exemption no longer applies and the statement may be used in 
subsequent litigation.92 
                                                                                                             
(“We hold that the clergyman/penitent privilege, like other privileges, is susceptible to 
implied waiver through conduct inconsistent with the maintenance of conversational 
privacy . . . .”). 
 87 Ray v. Cutter Labs., Div. of Miles, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 86, 88 (M.D. Fla. 
1990) (holding that a disclosure of information eliminates the expectation of privacy, 
and waives the privilege); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 114 F. Supp. 2d 
1054, 1055 (D. Or. 2000) (psychotherapist compelled to testify where defendant waived 
privilege by using psychologist’s diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder during 
prior hearing); Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 228 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 88 R.K. v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Latter Day Saints, No. C04-
2338RSM, 2006 WL2661059 at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 14, 2006) (holding that when the 
clergy-penitent privilege does not apply, the clergy member does not have a legal right 
to not comply with mandatory reporting laws, and therefore had a duty to report). 
 89 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505(2) (“A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose, 
and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication by the person to 
a member of the clergy in his or her capacity as spiritual adviser.”). 
 90 In Florida, “[i]t is black letter law that once the privilege is waived, and the 
horse out of the barn, it cannot be reinvoked.” Hamilton v. Hamilton Steel Corp., 409 
So. 2d 1111, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing FLA. STAT. § 90.507 and 5 
ERHARDT’S FLORIDA PRACTICE, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 507.1 (1977)); Cutter Labs., 746 F. 
Supp. at 88 (quoting Hamilton, 409 So. 2d at 1114); Doe v. Mann, No. 6:05-cv-259-Orl-
31DAB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65769, *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2006) (“Once a 
confidential communications, or a diagnosis based thereon, becomes disclosed at the 
privilege-holder’s request, the basis for the privilege departs and cannot be 
recaptured . . . .”). 
 91 Supra notes 68-85. 
 92 Supra note 90. 
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III. INSTITUTION-BASED ABUSE 
After the unveiling of numerous institutions hiding abuse, 
plaintiffs have filed suits under the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, federal conspiracy statutes, 
civil and criminal fraud theories, and state tort theories, including 
the doctrine of respondeat superior and negligence theories. 
A. Criminal RICO and Conspiracy to Commit Sexual 
Abuse Crimes 
The RICO and federal conspiracy statutes provide newer 
avenues for plaintiffs to file suits. While both these theories allow 
for plaintiffs to hold institutions accountable for patterns of 
conduct that allowed abuse to occur for continued periods of time, 
the two differ in the elements that satisfy the claims and the 
penalties that result from conviction. 
1. Background: Federal Prosecution of Sexual Abuse 
Crimes 
Sexual abuse crimes are prosecuted in the federal system 
under The Sexual Abuse Act of 1986.93 The age of the victim and 
whether force was used are two important facts that help 
determine the appropriate statute and punishment.94 Section 
2247 increases the maximum penalties for repeat offenders, and 
Section 2248 mandates restitution to the victims.95 
According to the United States Attorneys’ Manual, 
when investigating crimes involving child pornography, child 
sexual abuse, child sexual exploitation and obscenity: 
CEOS [Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section] and USAOs 
[United States Attorney Offices] will work together to ensure that 
[such] crimes . . . are vigorously enforced throughout the nation. 
Generally, such crimes are prosecuted by the USAO in the relevant 
district. However, CEOS attorneys have substantial experience in 
prosecuting these types of crimes and they are available to assist in 
the investigative stage and/or to handle trials as chair or co-chair.96 
 
 93 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–48. 
 94 18 U.S.C §§ 2241(a), (c) (2012). 
 95 Id. §§ 2247(a), 2248. 
 96 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-75.030 
(2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/
75mcrm.htm#9-75.030. 
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RICO defines the sexual abuse of a minor in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2243.97 Section 2243 delineates two offenses involving a “sexual 
act,” as defined in Section 2246(2).98 Subsection (a) makes it an 
offense, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States or a Federal prison, for a person to engage in, or 
attempt to engage in, a sexual act with someone who is (1) at 
least 12 but less than 16 years old and (2) at least four years 
younger than that person. The maximum punishment is 15 years 
imprisonment and/or a fine under Title 18.99 
This sexual abuse offense does not require the use of force 
or threats, or the administering of a drug, intoxicant, or other 
similar substance. It applies to behavior that the participants 
voluntarily and willingly engage in. The offense is intended to 
reach older, mature persons who take advantage of younger, 
immature persons, but not to reach sexual activity between 
persons of comparable age. Corroboration of the victim’s 
testimony is not required. Because subsection (a) reaches non-
coercive conduct, and because some states permit marriage by 
persons of less than 16 years of age, subsection (c)(2) sets forth a 
defense that the parties were married at the time of the sexual 
act.100 The defendant has the burden of establishing this defense 
by a preponderance of the evidence.101 
There are different provisions of RICO that apply to wards 
of the United States. Subsection (b) of Section 2243 also makes it 
an offense for a person to engage in a sexual act with someone (1) 
who is in official detention, and (2) who is under the custodial, 
supervisory, or disciplinary authority of the defendant.102 The 
maximum punishment is one year’s imprisonment and/or a fine 
under Title 18. Here too, corroboration of the victim’s testimony is 
not required. 
2. Criminal RICO v. Conspiracy 
The federal RICO statute provides for prosecution based 
upon patterns of criminal behavior, and conspiracy to commit 
criminal behavior as a part of a larger criminal endeavor.103 RICO 
creates a cause of action in both state and federal courts.104 Sexual 
 
 97 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012). 
 98 Id. §§ 2243, 2246(2). 
 99 Id. § 2243(a). 
 100 Id. § 2243(c)(2). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. § 2243(b). 
 103 Id. §§ 1961-68. 
 104 Id. § 1965. 
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abuse crimes under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241 through 2248, including 
sexual abuse of a minor, are predicate crimes that may trigger 
RICO prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968.105 Thus, if an 
organization engages in any two of 35 predicate crimes within a 
10-year period, it may be charged with racketeering. In Ohio, two 
bishops were charged under RICO, but a grand jury failed to find 
their mishandling of child sex abuse claims to constitute criminal 
racketeering.106 In addition, CEOS and the USAO have discretion 
as to whether a prosecution will take place under RICO.107 
The maximum penalty for a RICO violation is up to 20 
years in prison.108 Further, RICO prosecutions are not limited 
to organizations of crime, like the mafia.109 For example, while 
labor unions are not in the primary business of crime, they may 
still face RICO prosecutions.110 Thus, religious or other private 
organizations could be subject to the RICO statute.111 
In contrast to RICO, where particular categories of crimes 
must satisfy the requirements for prosecution, conspiracy under 
federal law may be triggered by the committing of any offense 
against United States law or the defrauding of the United States. 
So long as two or more persons conspire to commit crimes against 
the United States, they may be subject to prosecution.112 
 
 105 Id. §§ 1961-68 (2012); Hall v. Tressic, 381 F. Supp. 2d 101, 106-08 
(N.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 106 James F. McCarthy, The Cost of Abuse: 7 Indicted in Diocesan Sex Cases, 
CLEVELAND (Dec. 5, 2002), http://www.cleveland.com/abuse/index.ssf?/abuse/more/
103908428283790.html. 
 107 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 96, at 9-75.030. 
 108 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2012). 
 109 Pruzan, supra note 45, at 613-14. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Davis Lee Pharmacy, Inc., v. Manhattan Central Capital Corp., 327 F. 
Supp. 2d 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (The plaintiff commenced a federal action against 
business associates and their business, minister and church elders for alleged RICO 
violations involving consumer fraud). United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 
1982) (The court upheld a conviction under RICO based on the government’s allegation 
that defendant’s robberies were committed to finance defendants’ religious Black 
Muslim organization. The court noted that while the First Amendment prohibits 
governmental interference with religious beliefs, it does not protect practices which 
imperil public safety, peace or order from government scrutiny.) Hall v. Tressic, 318 F. 
Supp. 2d 101 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) A student brought sued a church, alleging that it had 
violated RICO by covering up sex abuse by a local priest. However the student failed to 
demonstrate that the acts constituted a pattern of racketeering activity to sustain a 
RICO claim. 
 112 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (“If two or more persons conspire either to commit 
any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency 
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act 
to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than five years, or both.”); see also United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 
1228 (11th Cir. 2012) (defendants convicted of conspiring to advertise, transport/ship, 
receive, and possess child pornography, and to obstruct an official proceeding, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371); United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2009) 
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As compared to RICO claims, general conspiracy charges 
also threaten lesser sentences. Whereas the penalty for RICO 
prosecution is up to 15 years in prison,113 a conspiracy regarding a 
criminal sex abuse crime only carries with it misdemeanor 
penalties, and the punishment for such conspiracy shall not 
exceed the maximum punishment provided for the 
misdemeanor.114 Furthermore, conspiracy prosecutions generally 
must begin within three to five years of the last overt act.115 
However, for RICO prosecutions, where there may not be proof of 
an overt act, the conspiracy only must be proved to have 
continued into the limitations period. Many of the principles 
described above also apply to state RICO laws and state 
conspiracy laws. 
B. Institutional Liability for the Abuse of Children 
Institutions may be found liable for the abuse of 
children on the basis of vicarious liability or fraud. While sex 
abuse has been found to fall outside the scope of employment, 
juries have more recently been inclined to hold employers liable 
for the sex abuse acts by their employees. Liability based on 
fraud requires showing a misrepresentation or concealment of 
a material fact, but an institution could be criminally 
prosecuted for a cover-up if it violates a federal statute. 
1. Civil Tort Liability of Employers for Employees 
and/or Volunteers 
Under respondeat superior, an employer will be found 
liable for civil child sex abuse torts committed by an employee, 
provided that (1) the abuse was committed within the time and 
space limitations of the agency relationship, (2) the employee 
was at least partially motivated by a purpose to serve the 
employer, and (3) the act was of a kind that the employee was 
hired to perform.116 This type of vicarious liability attaches to 
                                                                                                             
(Defendants convicted for conspiring to transport minors in interstate commerce with 
the intent of having the minors engage in illegal sexual activity). 
 113 18 U.S.C. § 371 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. § 3282; see also Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); 
United States v. Hitt, 249 F.3d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 116 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 70, 
at 502 (5th ed. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(1) (2006) (“An 
employer is subject to vicarious liability for a tort committed by its employee acting 
within the scope of employment.”). 
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an employer whether or not the employer is negligent or has 
direct control over the employee.117 It is distinguished from 
simple “but-for” causation (that the abuse would not have been 
committed but for the employment). In many jurisdictions, the 
abuse must have been a generally foreseeable consequence of 
the activity engaged in on behalf of the employer, such that the 
employer would not be shocked or startled by being held to 
account for the action.118 
Some courts have found that in the context of child sex 
abuse cases, the act of wrongdoing is so severe that it cannot be 
considered within the scope of employment.119 Without 
satisfaction of that requirement, respondeat superior liability 
cannot survive. However, the question of whether an act of 
sexual abuse can be within the scope of employment is most 
often a question of fact for the jury to decide, and the trend is 
toward finding employers liable for an employee’s sexual abuse 
of minors.120 In addition, while religious institutions have often 
raised First Amendment defenses to such liability, as discussed 
in Section VII.B. of this article, most states refused to recognize 
this defense against neutral, generally applicable criminal or 
civil tort laws, such as negligence. 
The doctrine does not turn on payment to employees or 
other subordinates. These considerations do not alter the 
responsibilities of principal or agent, so even volunteers can 
trigger liability on behalf of the organization for the torts they 
themselves commit.121 However, independent contractors, who 
are not under as much control or supervision as employers or 
certain volunteers, do not confer liability on behalf of the 
superior organization.122 Employers are also liable for their own 
negligent acts putting children at risk. A failure to institute or 
follow child protection policies triggers liability. Placing a 
 
 117 KEETON ET AL., supra note 116, at 501-02. 
 118 Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1082 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Fearing v. 
Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Or. 1999)); Cordts v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 252 Cal. 
Rptr. 629, 633 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Minnis v. Or. Mut. Ins. Co., 48 P.3d 137, 144-
45 (Or. 2002). 
 119 Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66, 71 (D. Conn. 1995). 
 120 Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d at 1082; Hardwicke v. American Boychoir Sch., 
902 A.2d 900, 920 (N.J. 2006); Jane Doe 130 v. Archdiocese of Portland in Or., 717 F. 
Supp. 2d 1120, 1137 (D. Or. 2010). 
 121 Southport Little League v. Vaughan, 734 N.E.2d 261, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2000) (upholding jury’s verdict that Little League volunteer was employee for purposes 
of respondeat superior in child sex abuse case). 
 122 Walderbach v. Archdiocese of Dubuque, Inc., 730 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 2007) 
(Archdiocese held not liable under respondeat superior for actions of independent contractor). 
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suspected or known pedophile at work with other children is the 
paradigm of negligent failure to protect children. 
In circumstances in which both the tortfeasor and the 
principal organization are found liable, they may be held 
jointly and severally liable for damages.123 While there is 
enough overlap to justify a Restatement including these issues, 
different states do maintain divergent rules for apportionment 
of the liability between the individual committing the abuse 
and the principal organization.124 
2. Criminal and Civil Fraud 
A civil fraud action for covering up a case of child sex 
abuse must demonstrate that there was a misrepresentation or 
concealment of a material fact. According to Professor Kathleen 
Brickey, “fraud has been found to encompass ‘conduct that 
involves a breach of duty that results in harm to another, conduct 
that involves an attempt to gain an undue advantage or to inflict 
harm through misrepresentation or breach of duty, and conduct 
that is inconsistent with recognized moral standards.’”125 
Identifying which facts are material, as well as whether 
there was a duty to reveal those facts, is critical. If a party is 
not under a duty to speak, a cause of action for the failure to 
disclose will not stand. However, if there is active concealment, 
the duty to speak is irrelevant. A civil litigant must also prove 
scienter, intent, causation, justifiable reliance, and damages 
caused by the abuser. 
Several federal statutes place the concept of “fraud” at 
their core, but there is no singular federal crime of “fraud.” 
Instead, the prosecution must fall under one of a number of 
federal statutes. One who covers up child sex abuse could be 
 
 123 Conaty v. Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc., C.A. No. 08C-05-050 CLS, 
2011 WL 2297712 at *1 (Del Super. Ct., May 19, 2011); Kaho’ohanohano v. Dep’t of 
Human Servs., State of Haw., 178 P.3d 538, 556 (Haw. 2008). 
 124 For example, Kentucky dictates that liability be apportioned to each joint 
tortfeasor. Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1998). On the other hand, Colorado mandates that liability be apportioned in 
proportion to the tortfeasors’ respective fault. Bohrer v. DeHart, 943 P.2d 1220, 1231 
(Colo. App. 1996). 
 125 Laura Russell, Note, Pursuing Criminal Liability for the Church and Its 
Decision Makers for Their Role in Priest Sexual Abuse, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 885, 900 
(2003). See generally KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME, 
CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2002); KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY (2d ed. 1984). 
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prosecuted under conspiracy to defraud, mail or wire fraud, 
securities fraud, etc.126 
Criminal fraud constitutes a wrong against the people as a 
whole, not simply a single individual; the federal government 
prosecutes on behalf of the public good. In contrast, civil fraud 
cases must target an individual who has committed a private 
wrong that offends or causes damage to the plaintiff ’s interests. 
A civil action may be maintained in tandem with a 
criminal prosecution.127 However, some states maintain strict 
rules against placing a party in the position of potential self-
incrimination and other privileges. In these states, such as 
Oregon,128 a civil litigant typically may prefer to wait to file a civil 
lawsuit until the end of the criminal prosecution. 
IV. SAFETY NET FOR CHILDREN ABUSED WITHIN THE HOME 
While the recovery process for children who have been 
sexually abused varies in duration, there is one known fact: a 
child cannot start the healing process until he or she has been 
able to identify the abuse as a product of the past. Given the 
finality associated with termination of parental rights it is 
understandable that courts are hesitant in issuing such orders 
carelessly. However, the legal complexities involved in such 
determinations can lead to continued abuse. Unfortunately, 
situations of continual abuse are not just limited to situations of 
familial custody, but have also been infiltrating the foster care 
systems. Children should feel safest at home, and in order to 
ensure the comfort of safety, the courts may need to reform the 
way in which child abuse claims are adjudicated. 
A. Family Court Issues 
Although there has been some legislative reform leading 
courts to terminate a parent’s right to custody after being 
convicted of sexual abuse, most jurisdictions do not 
automatically terminate the parental rights upon the finding of 
abuse.129 Rather, a court must conduct a hearing to determine 
 
 126 See, e.g., John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 734 N.W.2d 827 (Wis. 2007). 
 127 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY U.S.A. Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 104 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 128 United States v. Oberdorfer, No. 06:12-cr-00578-HU, 2013 WL 1760867, at 
*3 (D. Or. Apr. 24, 2013). 
 129 Grounds for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, CHILD WELFARE 
INFORMATION GATEWAY 3 (Jan. 2013), https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_
policies/statutes/groundtermin.pdf. (Explaining that in approximately 24 States and 
Puerto Rico, a parent’s rights can be terminated if he or she has been convicted of 
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the appropriateness of revoking the parental right of the 
accused.130 Given that these hearings are in the province of a 
state’s Family Court, the requirements for termination of 
rights may vary from state to state. However, the Supreme 
Court has established a minimum evidentiary standard to be 
applied regarding the termination of parental rights.131 Under 
the Court’s standard, the evidence provided against the parent 
in question must be clear and convincing.132 
There are, of course, several issues implicated by the 
additional hearing used to determine the accused’s parental 
rights. Most significantly, such proceedings subject the abused 
child to a “double dose of abuse.”133 Testimony of the victim may 
be crucial to satisfying the clear and convincing standard.134 But 
testifying may be an all-too-difficult task for the victim, who will 
have to relive the traumatic experience. The second issue 
implicated is the inability, under traditional evidentiary hearsay 
rules, to introduce hearsay testimony when the victim is unable 
or unwilling to testify.135 Fortunately, however, many states have 
adjusted their hearsay rules to allow for the hearsay statements 
of the victim, as they are highly relevant to the findings of the 
court.136 Regardless of the issues, it is imperative that the courts 
put the safety of the child as the first priority. 
In addition, the number of cases in which one parent 
accuses the other of sexually abusing their child continues to 
rise.137 Although many claims of this nature are accurate and are 
thereby an imperative part of the custody litigation, some of these 
claims can be strategically fabricated to gain a favorable opinion 
                                                                                                             
committing sexual abuse or another sexual offense. In 15 States, a conviction for rape or 
sexual assault that results in the conception of the child is a ground for termination of 
rights. Being required to register as a sex offender constitutes a ground in five States.) 
 130 Understanding Child Welfare and the Courts, CHILD WELFARE 
INFORMATION GATEWAY 2-4 (June 2011), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/
cwandcourts.pdf. 
 131 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 132 Id. at 748. 
 133 Karla-Dee Clark, Note, Innocent Victims and Blind Justice: Children’s 
Rights to be Free from Child Sex Abuse, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS., 214, 271 (1990). 
 134 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. 
 135 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 827 (1990) (holding that the victim’s 
statements to her pediatrician were inadmissible in court as hearsay). 
 136 See Timothy L. Arcaro, Child Victims of Sexual Abuse and the Law, 12 MICH. 
CHILD WELFARE L. J. 2, 10 (2009), available at http://chanceatchildhood.msu.edu/
pdf/CWLJ_sp09.pdf. 
 137 Deborah H. Patterson, Note, The Other Victim: The Falsely Accused Parent 
in a Sexual Abuse Custody Case, 30 J. FAM. L. 919, 920 (1992). 
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from the custodial decision maker.138 It is nearly impossible to 
quantify the number of false allegations made in custodial 
hearings, but there are certain issues that must be addressed to 
help prevent such statements. 
While parents may fabricate claims to gain a favorable 
custody decision, it is unusual for a child to fabricate a sexual 
abuse allegation.139 Studies suggest that intentionally false 
claims of child abuse made by children account for significantly 
less than one percent of all such claims.140 In fact, children are 
much more likely to understate the extent of abuse, which is 
highlighted by the alarming number of child abuse claims that 
go unreported.141 There is concern in custodial cases where one 
of the parents may be fabricating the allegations, which plays 
into the hotly debated issue of “parental alienation syndrome,” 
which is discussed in the Defenses section of this article. 
For example, to ensure the accuracy of statements about 
abuse, it is imperative for the reporting agency to follow strict 
and unified standards. Studies show that an overwhelming 
majority of agencies do not use the proper procedures when 
taking statements from those involved in custodial disputes.142 
In fact, some agencies do not even have established protocol.143 
One theory is that this haphazard method of investigating leads 
the agency official to “err on the side of caution.”144 Although it is 
theoretically impossible to absolutely prevent false allegations, 
the number of such incidents can be decreased with adherence to 
stricter agency protocol. 
There is also a need for adequate training of mandated 
reporters and the agencies that receive reports. The leading 
expert in the field, Victor Vieth, founder of the National Child 
Protection Training Center, explains that though there are a 
variety of reasons why mandated reporters do not report, “When a 
report is not made, not only is the abuse of a given child likely to 
 
 138 Patricia L. Martin, The Sacrifice of a Parent: An Analysis of Parental 
Rights Related to False Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse, 7 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & 
CLINICAL L. 251, 254 (2005). 
 139 How Often Do Children’s Reports of Abuse Turn Out to be False?, 
LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.leadershipcouncil.org/1/res/csa-acc.html (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2013). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Martin, supra note 138, at 256. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 257. 
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continue, but the chances an offender will violate other children 
also increases.”145 
B. Inadequacies and Dangers of Foster Care 
While it was originally intended to protect some of the 
nation’s most vulnerable children, the reality is that the state 
foster care systems are plagued with abuse. Generally, the state 
functions as the de facto parent of a foster child.146 Consequently, 
the state has assumed the responsibility of locating a safe home 
for the child, and has a continued obligation to ensure the safety 
of the child’s environment.147 Unfortunately, government 
practices have been inadequate to protect children.148 First, prior 
to placement, the agency should screen potential homes. While 
investigating prospective foster parents, the agency must 
employ careful measures to ensure a child’s welfare. Second, the 
agency must be sure to place children in appropriate homes. 
Third, the agency must provide adequate supervision of the 
foster homes. Of course, there are state regulations that have 
certain requirements for the agency workers.149 However, to 
ensure a child’s safety, all such requirements—and likely 
more—must be strictly followed, and often are not. 
In order to understand a child’s ability to bring suit 
against the state when foster care abuse does occur, we must 
first determine which type of claim is at suit. In situations 
where a foster child has been abused, the child is able to bring 
constitutional claims.150 Given the nature of the suit, the child 
may bring such a claim against the state. The Fourteenth 
Amendment not only protects a foster child’s liberty interest, but 
it also grants him or her protection from harm inflicted in the 
foster care system.151 As prescribed by the Fourteenth 
 
 145 Victor I. Vieth et al., Lessons from Penn State: A Call to Implement A New 
Pattern of Training for Mandated Reporters and Child Protection Professionals, 3 CENTER 
PIECE: NATIONAL CHILD PROTECTION TRAINING CENTER 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.ncptc.org/vertical/sites/%7B8634A6E1-FAD2-4381-9C0D-5DC7E93C9410%7D/
uploads/Vol_3_Issue_3__4.pdf. 
 146 See Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989). 
 147 Id.; See Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1440 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating 
that a state official’s duty to provide adequate care to a foster child generally 
terminates once the foster child is officially adopted). 
 148 See Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Government Liability for Abuse of Children in 
Foster Care, 2 Ann.2005 ATLA-CLE 1743 (2005). 
 149 Id. 
 150 See Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 151 See Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 501 (9th Cir. 1997); see also 
Campbell v. Burt, 141 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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Amendment, all persons have a conditional right to be free from 
intrusions on personal integrity.152 Moreover, eight federal courts 
of appeal have held that foster children have a constitutional 
right to safe conditions of confinement.153 The Circuits that 
observe this constitutional right also hold that a foster child has 
a right to be protected by their governmental custodians from 
injuries by third parties.154 
It has long been recognized that a governmental agency 
can be held accountable for the violation of a child’s protected 
liability interests.155 For example, since 1981 the Second Circuit 
has held that a state agency can be held liable for indifference 
to a foster child’s right of adequate supervision.156 
In situations where the state assumes control over an 
individual, such as in the context of foster care, an affirmative 
duty is triggered by which the state is mandated to provide 
protection to that person.157 When the state provides inadequate 
protection, the individual’s due process rights may be violated by 
the state’s “deliberate indifference” to its duty to protect. The 
threshold requirement for indifference varies among the 
jurisdictions. For instance, the Ninth Circuit requires that the 
action “shock the conscience” to meet the requisite indifference 
triggering the violation of a child’s liberty interest.158 
In addition, in some jurisdictions an abused foster child 
may also bring a tort claim against the state.159 Historically, all 
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 155 See Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1379 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 156 Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d at 147. 
 157 See Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 158 See Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that to 
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 159 See Kubitschek, supra note 148, at 1. 
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states were immune from suit.160 While some states are still 
protected by sovereign immunity, many have since waived 
their immunity, making it possible for foster children to bring 
suit.161 In states where immunity has been waived, the child 
can make a claim against, among other parties, the state.162 In 
states where absolute immunity is still present, the foster child 
can make a claim against the individual government employee 
if the employee’s failure to safeguard the child led to a violation 
of constitutional rights.163 
There are two different liability standards applicable to 
the tort claim of a plaintiff in the government’s custody. Several 
circuits adhere to some version of the deliberate indifference 
standard.164 Under this standard, a defendant is deliberately 
indifferent when he or she disregards a risk of harm of which he 
or she knew or should have known.165 Of course, what is necessary 
to reach the deliberate indifference standard varies among the 
jurisdictions recognizing this approach.166 For instance, the 
Second Circuit has ruled that deliberate indifference “cannot exist 
absent some knowledge triggering an affirmative duty to act,”167 
whereas the Fourth Circuit has mandated that officials must have 
ignored a danger for which they were placed on notice before the 
court will find deliberate indifference.168 Moreover, most 
jurisdictions allow the indifference to be inferred, with the most 
typical inference resulting from grossly negligent behavior.169 
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 166 See Kubitschek, supra note 148, at 3. 
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The other standard is the professional judgment standard. 
This standard, which focuses on a professional caretaker, is 
implicated when the professional’s decision is a substantial 
departure from accepted practice or standards.170 The presence of 
this departure leads to a violation of the foster child’s 
constitutional rights.171 
While it is appropriate for each jurisdiction to adhere to 
its own liability standard, there is one aspect of the adjudication 
process that must be unified across the entire justice system: 
mandating reporting agencies to follow strict and unified 
standards. By adequately training mandated reporters and 
agencies, each state will not only be protecting its employees, 
but they will also be ensuring that all claims of abuse are given 
the attention they require for the protection of children. 
V. RULES OF EVIDENCE IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
 While they may differ in their details, all courts are 
subject to evidentiary rules that are intended to fairly administer 
all judicial proceedings. Though discovery rules vary across 
jurisdictions, there are several pillars that are almost universal, 
for instance, the rule against hearsay. While the general rule 
against hearsay continues to be a staple in almost every 
jurisdiction’s evidentiary rules, like most other judicial doctrines, 
it is subject to specific exceptions. It is also particularly important 
in proceedings relating to child sex abuse. 
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 414—Similar Crimes in Child 
Molestation Cases 
Federal courts currently allow past convictions of child 
molestation to be admitted as evidence against the defendant in 
a child molestation case.172 The vast majority of other convictions 
may not be admitted, except for the purpose of demonstrating 
elements such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
and knowledge, in the commission of a crime.173 However, Federal 
Rule of Evidence 414 specifies previous convictions of child 
molestation as an exception to the general rule of evidence. 
 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 FED. R. EVID. 414(a). 
 173 Id. at 404(b)(2). 
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Despite arguments to the contrary, it has been 
determined repeatedly that Rule 414 is constitutional.174 The 
application of this rule does not violate the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment;175 it does not impermissibly 
deprive defendants accused of the sexual abuse of a minor of 
the same rights enjoyed by other defendants accused of other 
crimes.176 Similarly, “Rule 414 does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment, [because it] does not impose criminal punishment 
at all; it is merely an evidentiary rule.”177 Those accused of 
sexual child abuse are not guaranteed a right to a trial free 
from relevant prejudicial evidence.178 When the proposed 
evidence is relevant to the charge at hand, and is not overly 
prejudicial, it may be used in assessing the character of the 
defendant.179 
If a prosecutor intends to introduce past convictions of 
sexual child abuse into evidence, the prosecutor must provide 
the defendant with prior notice. Currently Rule 414 requires 
that the prosecution notify the defendant at least 15 days prior 
to the trial or at a later time that the court allows for good 
cause.180 This ensures that the inclusion of such evidence does 
not violate the constitutional rights of the defendant. 
To guarantee that Rule 414 survives constitutional 
attack, the evidence admitted under the rule must not be 
overly prejudicial. As a result, in all cases, the application of 
Rule 414, and thus the inclusion of past convictions of child 
sexual abuse, is subject to judicial discretion.181 Though not 
specifically identified in Rule 414, the analysis of whether to 
allow evidence of such past convictions is subject to the 
standard balancing test, weighing the probative value of the 
evidence against the prejudicial effect as determined under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.182 In the event that the evidence 
is overly prejudicial, such as explicit photographs depicting the 
previous crime, a judge may choose to exclude the evidence 
despite the prosecution’s attempted application of Rule 414. 
For past crimes to be included, it is not necessary for the 
current and past crimes to be identical. Currently, federal courts 
 
 174 United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 175 United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 176 Id. at 883. 
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 182 LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1027. 
426 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:2 
may admit previous convictions of like crimes that demonstrate 
the propensity of the defendant to engage in sexual activities 
which victimize children.183 In addition to crimes relating to the 
direct sexual abuse of children, which vary by element, past 
convictions regarding child pornography may also be admitted 
against the defendant.184 
Past convictions of like or identical convictions may also 
be admitted into evidence regardless of the date of the previous 
convictions. While other evidentiary rules specify limits on the 
extent into which the past may be delved, there are no 
presumptive time limits for previous crimes relating to the 
sexual abuse of a child.185 No such limitations are included in 
Rule 414, nor have any been established through its subsequent 
judicial application.186 
B. Alternate Options to Rule 414 
While a state judiciary can certainly enact its own 
judicial rule similar to that of Rule 414, the vast majority of 
states have not yet adopted rules of evidence patterned after 
Rule 414. Currently, California, Louisiana, and Texas have 
enacted evidentiary rules based on Rule 414.187 In many state 
courts, however, the common law doctrine of the “lustful 
disposition” exception, codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(b), has arisen.188 Thus, previous crimes of the sexual abuse of 
a child may be admitted, subject to an appropriate balancing test, 
as confirmation of a defendant’s lustful disposition.189 In many 
instances, for this exception to apply, the evidence must 
demonstrate a sexual desire for the specific victim.190 In addition, 
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the evidence must represent conduct that would naturally be 
interpreted as an expression of sexual desire.191 
States that employ the “lustful disposition” exception may 
in fact allow substantially more evidence to be admitted against a 
defendant than a court applying Rule 414. While Rule 414 allows 
specifically for the admission of past convictions, the “lustful 
disposition” exception through Rule 404(b) allows for additional 
character evidence, which may not have escalated into a 
conviction, but is nonetheless seen as applicable to the current 
case.192 Thus, through the use of Rule 404(b), coupled with the 
Rule 403 balancing analysis, most states have not deemed a 
separate rule, such as Rule 414, a necessity. 
While evidentiary rules are necessary to ensure fairness in 
the judicial process, the courts have also remained cognizant of 
the fragile nature of child sex abuse cases. The nature of child sex 
abuse crimes makes them “[t]he most difficult to prove in 
court,”193 which is magnified by the stigma and legal ramifications 
associated with a conviction. Society, however, has a need to 
protect its children, and therefore evidentiary rules allowing for a 
more efficient child sex abuse proceeding are necessary. 
VI. ENHANCED FEDERAL SENTENCING REQUIREMENTS 
Many federal statutes prohibiting the sexual abuse of a 
child provide modification to the statutory minimums in 
sentencing. While federal sentencing is multi-faceted and subject 
to judicial discretion, many statutes identify the minimum and 
maximum sentences the court may apply following a conviction 
for violating the statute. In many cases the statutory guidelines 
for sentencing are increased, identifying a desire to deter 
recidivism among those who have been convicted of crimes 
concerning the sexual abuse of a child. 
Currently, in the conviction of aggravated sexual abuse, in 
which a previous like conviction exists, the maximum sentence is 
doubled.194 Similarly, conviction of the sexual exploitation of 
children, with a like conviction, increases the minimum sentence 
from 15 to 25 years imprisonment, and the maximum from 30 to 
50 years.195 
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Currently, previous convictions need not correspond 
directly to the specific statute violated for the statutory 
sentencing guidelines to be increased.196 For the most part, 
judicial discretion is employed in determining the applicability of 
a previous conviction to the provision of the statute allowing for 
the sentencing increase.197 However, recent developments indicate 
that the range of applicable convictions may be narrowing. For 
example, 18 U.S.C. § 2252, entitled “Certain activities relating to 
material involving the sexual exploitation of minors,” was 
replaced by the Child Protection Act of 2012.198 While Section 
2252 allows past convictions “under the laws of any State” to 
trigger the appropriate sentencing increase, the Child Protection 
Act of 2012 removes “state” convictions from the list of violations 
that may trigger increased sentencing guidelines. In this way, 
federal legislation may indicate an intent to erode the application 
of increased sentencing standards. 
VII. DEFENSES 
A. Parental Alienation Syndrome and the Perils of Custody 
by the Abusing Parent 
Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) is a hotly 
contested theory promulgated by Dr. Richard Gardner in the 
1980s. According to Dr. Gardner, PAS’s primary manifestation 
is the child’s campaign of denigration against the parent—a 
campaign that has no justification.199 The supposed “disorder 
results from the combination of indoctrinations by the 
alienating parent [(the parent influencing the child)] and the 
child’s own contributions to the vilification of the alienated 
parent.”200 In other words, the alienating parent may influence 
the child through both direct and indirect actions to 
disproportionately dislike the other, alienated parent. 
PAS has become a point of controversy in numerous 
custody disputes involving child sex abuse because it has been 
the basis, at times, for transferring custody from the alienating 
parent to the alienated parent accused of sexual abuse.201 For 
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instance, in Karen B. v. Clyde M., an infant daughter made 
statements suggesting sexual abuse perpetrated by her 
father.202 The mother filed for sole custody of the daughter 
based upon those claims.203 The court, citing PAS, found the 
claims to be baseless and awarded sole custody to the father.204 
Similarly, in John A. v. Bridget M., sexual abuse allegations 
levied against the father resulted in awarding custody of the 
children to the father on the basis of PAS.205 There were no 
confirmed findings of abuse in either case. 
The DSM, otherwise known as the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, provides a common 
language and standard criteria for the classification of mental 
disorders. The DSM IV does not include PAS as there was not 
enough scientific evidence to warrant its inclusion.206 In 
addition, PAS is routinely criticized for lacking a scientific 
basis and failing to meet the burden of proof to merit 
acceptance as a scientific hypothesis.207 
B. First Amendment Issues: When a Religious Entity Is a 
Defendant 
In 2002, the Boston Globe broke the story of a concerted 
cover up of child sex abuse by bishops in the Catholic Church.208 
Before then, there were isolated reports of abuse by individual 
priests, with the most disturbing being the abuse of dozens of 
boys by Louisiana priest Gilbert Gauthe. Gauthe was convicted 
in 1985 and served 10 years in prison.209 In the aftermath of the 
Globe’s story, the issue of institutional cover-up came to the fore 
across the country, though editors at other newspapers resisted 
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the story. For example, reporter Marie Rhode was removed from 
the religion beat because she brought a similar story of cover-up 
to the editorial board of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel.210 
The Roman Catholic Church is the largest religious 
institution in the world.211 With its numbers, and its mandatory 
policies of shielding predators from law enforcement and public 
disclosure while permitting them access to more children, this 
institution was the perfect one to establish the paradigm for the 
press and the public of institutional cover-up. Once the factual 
outlines became visible, reporters, prosecutors, and survivors in 
other institutions took notice. The result was an avalanche of 
information about religious institution-based abuse, spanning 
every religion imaginable, from the Catholic Church to Orthodox 
Jews, especially the Hasidim, to Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, 
and Latter-Day Saints.212 Close on the heels of the religious 
institutions were the secular institutions including Penn State,213 
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Syracuse,214 the Citadel,215 Horace Mann,216 Poly Prep,217 the Los 
Angeles public school system,218 and many others. 
Religious institutions charged with abetting and covering 
up sexual abuse of children often raise First Amendment 
defenses. Religious organizations have routinely invoked the 
First Amendment to avoid discovery, liability, and damages. But 
the law is showing less willingness to accept these defenses. The 
law has developed in this arena to the point now that there is 
widespread consensus: the First Amendment is no defense to the 
application of neutral, generally applicable criminal or civil tort 
laws, e.g., negligence.219 
At one point, lawyers proposed a theory of “clergy 
malpractice,” but that entangled the courts in calibrating and 
determining religious law. Thus, arguments opposing “clergy 
malpractice” as the measure of duty and care were successful. Most 
states now approach these cases through analysis of the conduct 
taken, without reference to religious belief, and measure it by 
neutral criminal or tort principles. 
Three states do recognize a First Amendment defense 
for religious organizations in child sex abuse cases, including 
Missouri, Utah, and Wisconsin.220 In Wisconsin, at least, it does 
not operate as absolute immunity, because the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court has now recognized a fraud cause of action 
against religious organizations for the cover up of child sex 
abuse.221 The trend is clear, though, in favor of rejection of a 
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First Amendment defense in these cases. The most 
comprehensive and recent analysis by a state supreme court to 
date is Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis.222 
The free exercise and establishment clauses of the First 
Amendment are implicated in cases where claims are brought 
against a religious organization, such as a church, temple, 
synagogue, or mosque. The establishment clause does not 
preclude the court’s exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction over 
such claims.223 The clause also does not bar the examination of 
religious organization documents relating to the underlying 
facts that are the basis of the claim.224 
In general, most courts have ruled that the First 
Amendment does not bar civil claims arising from the sexual 
assault or abuse of a minor or adult by an employee/member/leader 
of a religious organization.225 Courts may hear claims regarding 
tortious conduct where a resolution does not require interpretation 
of religious doctrine or religious duties.226 
Secondly, common law duties, predicated on secular 
conduct, do not involve or implicate religious beliefs. As a result, 
in most states, the religious beliefs of an organization do not 
excuse it from abiding by a valid law prohibiting conduct that 
the state may regulate. For example, tort liability may be 
imposed without violating the First Amendment so long as it 
derives from neutral, generally applicable tort law.227 However, 
where interpretation of religious doctrine is required, the First 
Amendment bars tort liability.228 As a result, most courts have 
ruled that the First Amendment does not bar civil claims 
arising from the sexual assault or abuse of a minor or adult by 
an employee/member/leader of a religious organization.229 
Courts may hear claims regarding tortious conduct where a 
resolution does not require interpretation of religious doctrine 
or religious duties.230 
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Finally, the First Amendment does not prohibit recovery 
for the sexual assault of a minor or adult by a 
member/leader/employee of a religious organization. The 
application of secular standards to secular tortious conduct by 
a religious organization is constitutional.231 The state has a 
strong interest in protecting children from sexual assault or 
abuse and may authorize civil damages against a religious 
organization that knowingly creates a situation in which such 
injuries are likely to occur.232 Punitive damages, against the 
individual and the religious organization, are not barred by 
First Amendment guarantees or public policy.233 While the free 
exercise clause protects religious beliefs and instances of 
religious conduct, it does not shield religious organizations 
from liability for child sex abuse where, for example, criminal 
sanctions are unavailable and punitive damages against 
individuals would be insufficient.234 
PAS and the First Amendment have both been raised as 
defenses in sex abuse cases. Fortunately, courts have been 
rejecting these defenses, as they are both unmeritorious. PAS 
lacks scientific standing, while the First Amendment is not a 
defense to the application of neutral, generally applicable laws. 
CONCLUSION 
There is increasing agreement on a number of legal 
rules and principles in the child sex abuse arena. SOLs across 
the country are becoming increasingly liberalized, with all but 
one state either lengthening or eliminating child sex abuse SOLs 
entirely. Given the current trend, it is likely that all states will 
eventually eliminate these SOLs, and many will adopt civil 
revival legislation to create access to justice for victims whose 
SOLs have expired. This development alone will increase the 
number of child sex abuse cases in the future and the need for a 
Restatement of Child Sex Abuse. 
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There will also be an increased likelihood of such cases, 
because states are strengthening their mandatory reporting 
laws, with 48 states currently requiring specific professionals 
to report child abuse, and many considering increasing the 
categories of those required to report. Exceptions, like the 
confessional exception, have been repealed in some states, and 
narrowed in others. 
There are other areas where there is agreement as well, 
including agreement among a majority of federal courts on the 
standard to be applied when foster children sue the state for 
abuse—that foster children have a constitutional right to safe 
placements; that the Parental Alienation Syndrome phenomenon 
is largely discredited; and that the First Amendment is no defense 
to a religious employer’s negligence in creating unsafe conditions 
for children. Of course, this forum is not the place to be 
comprehensive, and so there are more issues to be addressed, 
from child pornography and trafficking to state and federal civil 
rights claims on behalf of victims. 
The time is ripe, therefore, to create a Restatement of 
Child Sex Abuse. There are thousands of child sex abuse cases 
across the country, mostly prosecuted in state court, but also at 
the federal level. As more survivors come forward, their bravery 
encourages even more to do so, and, therefore, there is likely to 
be a growing number of cases. The dust has settled on many of 
the issues, and strong, identifiable conclusions and trends are 
apparent. Lawyers, judges, public policymakers, and scholars 
would benefit from a compendium of the interrelated issues 
involved in these cases and an explanation of how the law has 
been shaped and where it is headed. 
 
